Lessons from the Financial Crisis

As we mark the 10th anniversary of the onset of the financial crisis, I would like to focus on some of the lessons we should draw from that harrowing experience, and the implications of those lessons for regulatory policy going forward. (As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System.)

The first lesson is that financial crises can have grave consequences — for the economy and the nation — that can linger for many years. The toll from the financial crisis was severe, with 9 million jobs lost and 8 million housing foreclosures amid the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression. Moreover, the road back has been long and slow. Despite economic policies oriented toward supporting recovery, it has taken eight years to push the unemployment rate down to a level consistent with the Federal Reserve’s employment objective. Other residual impacts include the large size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet; significantly higher public debt; and substantial damage to public trust in the nation’s government and financial institutions. 

The second lesson follows from the first. We need to ensure that we have a resilient financial system. To that end, we must ensure that the safeguards put in place in response to the crisis are fully appreciated and respected. But, it also means that we need to finish the job — for example, by building out a fully workable regime for resolving a complex, global firm if one were to become insolvent. We need to ensure that our financial system can continue to provide critical services not just during good times, but also during periods of stress. 

These objectives are particularly relevant today, when reopening the Dodd-Frank Act and modifying our regulatory framework are under consideration. While it is appropriate to evaluate adjustments that might improve our regulatory regime, it is critical that we do not forget the hard-learned lessons of the crisis and — in the haste to reverse course — undermine the robustness and resiliency of the financial system. 

The U.S. housing market boom and bust

At the heart of the crisis was the U.S. housing boom and bust. Between 1997 and 2006, U.S. home prices nearly doubled in real terms on a national basis. Then, when the boom turned to bust, real home prices reversed course, declining by about 40 percent on a national basis, with larger price declines in several states, according to the CoreLogic home price index. The magnitude of the national price declines was unprecedented during the postwar period.

The evolution of the financial crisis illustrates many key issues, including the potential hazards of financial innovation, the procyclicality of the financial system, and the importance of confidence in sustaining effective financial intermediation.

The housing boom and bust underscores several important lessons. First, the financial sector is not only a very complex system, but also one that can be inherently unstable — subject to excess, then sharp reversal. This is especially the case when an important innovation occurs, and market participants don’t fully appreciate the powerful feedback loops that first sustain a boom and then contribute to a bust when the process runs in reverse. This means that we as regulators must continually evaluate the financial system and monitor the landscape for new developments and innovations that, if taken too far, could lead to excess and put the system at risk. 

Second, when there are potential excesses that could threaten financial stability, we should look to temper them. For example, in the run-up to the financial crisis, macroprudential tools — such as requiring larger down payments or more closely evaluating the incomes of borrowers — could have been implemented to limit the demand for housing. If such an approach were successful, home prices would not have risen so dramatically, and the subsequent bust would have been less severe. Another approach would have required financial intermediaries to build stronger capital and liquidity buffers as protection against a housing bust and an economic downturn. 

Third, we need to carefully monitor the incentives that govern the behavior of borrowers, savers, and financial intermediaries. 

Culmination of the crisis

The bust exposed many structural flaws in the financial system that exacerbated its instability. Without being exhaustive, these included the instability of the tri-party repo system, which supported the nation’s short-term funding markets; the risks of runs in the money market mutual fund industry; and the risk of contagion caused by the huge volume of outstanding bilateral (non-centrally cleared) over-the-counter (OTC) derivative obligations between the major financial intermediaries. 

The near-collapse of the U.S. financial system underscores three critical lessons. 

First, financial institutions must be robust to stress. In particular, they need to have enough capital to be considered solvent even after sustaining significant losses, so that they can maintain the market access needed to recapitalize. They also need sufficient liquidity buffers so that they can respond to shocks without having to sell illiquid assets. 

Second, when we identify potential sources of instability that could amplify shocks, we need to make structural changes to the financial system to reduce or eliminate them. For example, the financial crisis made it clear that changes were needed in how tri-party repo transactions were unwound each day, net asset values were calculated for prime money market mutual funds, and OTC derivative obligations were cleared, settled, and risk-managed. 

Third, there should be a viable and predictable resolution regime. We need to be able to resolve a large, systemically important bank or securities firm in a way that limits contagion and stress on the rest of the financial system, while at the same time protecting the taxpayer against loss. 

Considerable progress

So, where are we relative to what is needed? As I see it, there has been considerable progress. The nation’s largest banks are much safer because of substantially higher capital and liquidity requirements, as well as robust stress tests. This enhanced resiliency has been achieved without a significant negative impact on the broad availability of credit — recognizing that it is now more difficult for households with low credit scores to obtain a mortgage. Most importantly, improving the capacity of such firms to continue to lend during times of stress should make the overall economy more stable. 

We have also made significant progress in addressing many of the structural weaknesses uncovered by the financial crisis. Money market reform has made the prime money market mutual fund industry smaller and safer. We have also reduced the amount of risk in the system by requiring that most standardized OTC derivatives be cleared through central counterparties, where multilateral netting occurs. 

More work is still needed

Yet, we should not be complacent, as there are important areas where our work is not complete. Relative to other countries, the United States has limited ability to implement effective macroprudential tools. That is because oversight is shared by several different entities, and the power to implement macroprudential tools is constrained. Another challenge is the diverse structure of the U.S. financial system, in which non-banks and capital markets play a substantial role in credit intermediation. Although the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) could conceivably play a greater role here, whether it will be able to do so effectively remains uncertain. 

Another issue that needs attention is the ability to resolve large, complex financial firms that operate on a global basis. The framework of requiring such firms to hold a large buffer of debt that could be converted into equity at the time of non-viability is an important step forward. But, the task of operationalizing this on a global basis in a way that is fully credible to these firms’ customers and counterparties has not been completed. Achieving clarity about the roles and responsibilities of home and host country authorities is still a work in progress. 

Where the pendulum may have swung too far

At the same time, there are some areas where the pendulum may have swung too far, where the costs of regulation — including compliance costs and the potential impact on the provision of services — are likely to exceed the benefits. In this vein, I favor regulatory relief for smaller banking organizations. First, such firms individually are not systemically important, and therefore do not pose a significant risk to the viability of the U.S. financial system. Second, the regulatory burdens on smaller firms can be heavy because they don’t have the scale over which compliance and other regulatory costs can be spread. Regulatory requirements should be appropriately calibrated to avoid inadvertently creating a competitive advantage for larger financial firms. 

I also think that the Volcker rule could be modified so that its implementation would be less burdensome. As I see it, regulators could review the criteria for permissible market-making. Trading activity should be viewed as market-making when it is customer-facing and inventories are not excessively large or stale. Market-making serves an important function, and it is important that trading desks can intervene and buy during flash crashes or sell during flash surges. Permitting this could provide greater liquidity and stability to financial markets. I would also exempt smaller banking institutions from the Volcker rule since they rarely, if ever, engage in proprietary trading. 

Do no harm

Many speculate that Congress will make changes to the Dodd-Frank Act. If the scope is confined mainly to small bank relief and adjusting how the Volcker rule is applied, I have no objection. But, because the Dodd-Frank Act addresses many of the key lessons of the crisis, I think it appropriate that changes be made carefully — with a paring knife, rather than with a meat cleaver. Here, I would underscore the importance of preserving higher capital and liquidity requirements for systemically important banks; Title VII, which mandates the central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives; and Title VIII, which gives the Federal Reserve an oversight role for financial market utilities that are systemically important, and which helps promote more uniform risk management standards. 

In conclusion, as we reflect on potential changes to the U.S. regulatory regime, we should not lose sight of the horrific damage caused by the financial crisis, including the worst recession of our lifetimes and millions of people losing their jobs and homes. We had a woefully inadequate regulatory regime in place, and while it is much better now, there is still work to do. We should finish the job as quickly as possible, and we should do no harm as we adjust our regulatory regime to make it more efficient.         

William C. Dudley is president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This viewpoint article is drawn and edited from his remarks, as presented for delivery, at a Nov. 6 speech at The Economic Club of New York in New York City.